Friend or foe?:Bernard Williams and political constitutionalism by Mac Amhlaigh, Cormac S.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Friend or foe?
Citation for published version:
Mac Amhlaigh, CS 2020, 'Friend or foe? Bernard Williams and political constitutionalism', Res Publica.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-020-09481-1
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1007/s11158-020-09481-1
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Res Publica
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 16. Oct. 2020
Vol.:(0123456789)
Res Publica
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-020-09481-1
1 
Friend or Foe?: Bernard Williams and Political 
Constitutionalism
Cormac S Mac Amhlaigh1 
Accepted: 9 September 2020 
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
This article looks at Bernard Williams’s relevance to particular debates in constitu-
tional theory about the legitimacy of two competing models of institutional design: 
political constitutionalism which endorses giving the final say on the meaning of 
constitutional rights to legislatures; and legal constitutionalism which endorses giv-
ing the final say on the meaning of rights to courts. Recent defences of political con-
stitutionalism have made claims about the realism of their accounts when compared 
with legal constitutionalism and have co-opted Bernard Williams’s realism to sup-
port their case. This article examines these claims, concluding that these accounts 
of political constitutionalism rely on a distinctly non-Williamsian form of political 
moralism in that they assume a legitimacy for political constitutionalism which is 
prior to politics and political disagreement. It offers an alternative defence of politi-
cal constitutionalism, a partial defence, which, it argues, is closer to the realism of 
Bernard Williams than these accounts.
Keywords Political realism≠ · Liberalism · Legislative supremacy · Judicial 
supremacy · Judicial review · Fundamental rights protection
Introduction
Political Constitutionalism (‘PC’) is a form of what Waldron has called ‘political’ 
political theory (Waldron 2013). That is, that it is a form of political theory which 
relates specifically to the institutions of authority and their organisation in terms of 
their make-up, powers and relationships inter se. As such it can be distinguished 
from studies of institutions based on efficiency or consequences which have more 
traditionally been the concern of political science, or questions of justice which have 
traditionally been the concern of political theory and political philosophy (Waldron 
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2013, p. 10). Rather, as political theory, it attempts to create a link between more 
conventional political theory such as accounts of justice, liberty or equality, and 
forms of institutional design.
PC puts a particular emphasis on political disagreement involving not just the 
good, but also the right. It can therefore be distinguished as a theory of rights from 
liberal accounts which take the view that disagreements about rights are soluble by 
recourse to an ‘original position’ (Rawls 1973), ‘overlapping consensus’ (Rawls 
1993) or according to a particular constitutional settlement (Dworkin 1978). PC’s 
opening premise, then, is the ‘fact’ of disagreement about particular constitutional 
values which it then overlays with normative values of equality or equal respect and 
concern (Waldron 1999; Bellamy 2007).
PC is therefore political in two senses: it is political in that it attempts to provide 
a political theory of institutional design by tracing the relationship between the form 
and powers of institutions of authority and normative values, as well as emphasis-
ing the need for politics given societal disagreement on questions of normative val-
ues including fundamental rights. Adding together the fact of political disagreement 
with a need for institutions of authority which must act notwithstanding such disa-
greement,1 PC endorses the supremacy of democratically elected legislatures over 
courts as the most legitimate form of ultimate decision-making in democratic consti-
tutional systems (Waldron 2006). It is this focus on a ‘fact’ of societal disagreement 
which have led some to characterise PC as a form ‘realist’ political theory, (Bellamy 
2016; Fabbrizi 2018) and explains the recent adoption by political constitutionalists 
of the realist thinking of Bernard Williams to support their defence of legislative 
supremacy.2
This contribution will explore the affinities between Williams’s political realism 
and PC as an account of legitimate institutional design. It will examine the realist 
claims made by PC, as well as survey some recent attempts to support the PC posi-
tion with Bernard Williams’s realism.3 It argues that whereas there are some superfi-
cial affinities between the focus of PC and Williams’s realist theory, ultimately Wil-
liams’s account of legitimacy is not a natural ally of the PC position on questions of 
institutional design. This is  due to the fact that in prescribing legislative supremacy 
as the most legitimate form of institutional design, PC, at least in the form endorsed 
by Waldron and Bellamy, constitutes a form of political moralism; an approach to 
legitimacy from which Williams explicitly attempted to distance himself in his real-
ist account. Rather, the paper argues, Williamsian realism is more supportive of 
positions in the PC debate which argue that the legitimacy of PC is defensible, but 
only in part, where its legitimacy is predicated on the broader ‘minimal legitimacy’ 
of a governing regime (Mac Amhlaigh 2016a, b).
1 What Waldron calls the ‘circumstances of politics’ defined as the ‘felt need among the members of a 
certain group for a common framework or decision or course of action on some matter, even in the face 
of disagreement about what that framework, decision or action should be’ (Waldron 1999, p. 102).
2 In particular, his late essay ‘Realism and Moralism in Political Theory’ (Williams 2005). See (Waldron 
2013; Bellamy 2016).
3 With a particular emphasis on Bellamy (2016).
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The paper will proceed as follows: Part 2 provides a summary of Bernard Wil-
liams’s well-known realist account of political legitimacy. Part 3 gives an overview 
of the PC position and particularly the links drawn by PC between political disa-
greement and the putative superior legitimacy of legislative supremacy. Part 4 traces 
the relationships drawn by political constitutionalists’ defence of legislative suprem-
acy and Williams’s realist account of legitimacy. Part 5 shows that first impressions 
notwithstanding, PC, at least as defended by some of its main supporters, is better 
understood as a form of political moralism of the type that Williams rejected. Part 
6 argues that Williamsian realism can support PC, but only with respect to partial 
defences of PC, where it features as part of the overall legitimacy of the governing 
regime.
Bernard Williams’s Political Realism
Normative political theory is currently experiencing a ‘realist turn’ with a resurgence 
of interest in the realistic or non-ideal dimensions of normative theory (Galston 
2010; Rossi and Sleat 2014). Much of the realist turn involves an attempt to shift the 
interests of political theory from questions of justice to questions of legitimacy and 
can therefore be interpreted, at least in part, as a backlash to the success of justice-
based accounts of political theory such as that of John Rawls (Rossi and Sleat 2014). 
Within this realist turn in normative political theory, Bernard Williams’s work on 
realism—and in particular his late essay ‘Realism and Moralism in Political the-
ory’—has proven to be particularly influential (Sleat 2010).
In the essay, Williams argues that conventional normative theories of politics 
such as liberalism or utilitarianism are forms of political moralism which start from 
the wrong place in thinking about the legitimacy of authority. The legitimacy of 
authority, starts, for Williams, not with the identification of utilitarian principles 
which provide a single teleology for political processes, (‘the enactment model’ of 
political moralism) or through the identification of a liberal moral framework within 
which politics can take place, (‘the structural model’ of political moralism), but with 
a response to what he calls the ‘first political question’; that is the securing of ‘order, 
protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation’ (Williams 2005, p. 3).
For Williams, the first political question does not relate to a question which is first 
answered and settled before moving on to consider other political questions. Rather 
the first political question is ‘first’ in the sense that it is the paramount question of 
politics which is repeatedly asked and answered. This emphasis on the ongoing res-
olution of the first political question is one of the prominent realist features of Wil-
liams’s account in describing how the legitimacy of authority actually works in prac-
tice. In this way, Williams’s approach can be distinguished from liberal responses 
which tend to emphasise a relatively static, fixed political settlement which supports 
the legitimacy of subsequent political action.
Whereas the first political question is, for Williams, a necessary condition for 
the legitimacy of authority, it is not a sufficient condition. Politics must, moreover, 
satisfy a ‘basic legitimation demand’ (‘BLD’) (Williams 2005, p. 4). This requires 
the resolution of the first political question—the securing of order etc.—in an 
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‘acceptable’ way. That is, alongside resolving the first political question, an author-
ity must also offer a ‘justification of its power’ (Williams 2005, p. 5) to each subject. 
Williams is careful to distinguish politics from war or pure coercion, noting that ‘the 
situation of one lot of people terrorizing another lot of people is not per se a political 
situation’ (Williams 2005, p. 5). As much is clear, for Williams, from the premise of 
the first political question—if politics starts with the resolution of the first political 
question, then it is primarily concerned with a resolution of the violence and pure 
coercion which is conventionally associated with the idea of a state of nature. In 
asserting authority over its subjects, an authority makes a claim to the effect that its 
actions are an improvement over the state of nature, and as such it must demonstrate 
how its acts are, in fact, an improvement on this state of affairs.
As such, Williams’s view is not one which is completely devoid of moral con-
siderations.4 He notes, however, that the morality implicit in his starting point in 
the first political question is not a morality that is ‘prior to politics’ (Williams 2005, 
p. 5). It is, rather, a moralised conception of politics, at least to the extent that the 
safety and security of individuals is secured, and its securing is justified to each 
individual subjected to the authority. In this way, Williams’s realism can be distin-
guished from classical realism which views politics as a method of getting power 
and holding on to it.5
One of the primary differences between Williams’s account and liberal accounts 
of legitimacy, then, is that non-liberal states could be legitimate under Williams’s 
account. For Williams, the under-specification of what, precisely, the BLD requires 
in terms of values and principles, means that liberalism goes further, sometimes 
much further, in terms of what the BLD requires. In Williams’s view, liberals ‘raise 
the standards’ of what it means to fear insecurity, pain and suffering and ‘raise the 
expectations of what the state can do’ (Williams 2005, p. 7).
Political Constitutionalism as Political Theory
The realist elements in Williams’s account of legitimacy have attracted the atten-
tion of political constitutionalists who see in him a natural ally to their accounts of 
legitimate institutional design. Their preference for legislative supremacy in ques-
tions of institutional design stems from a key empirical assumption they make about 
political life: disagreement. In advocating legislative supremacy, political constitu-
tionalists depart from the ‘circumstances of politics’ (Waldron 1999, 102). In the 
circumstances of politics, not only do we disagree about the meaning of the good, 
but we also disagree about the right, including the origins, nature and meaning of 
fundamental rights as well as the values which they purport to protect. However, 
we still require collective action on these matters (Christiano 2000, p. 518). Thus, 
notwithstanding such disagreement, some decision-making authority is necessary to 
4 Leading some to argue that Williams is insufficiently ‘realist’ on this point (Sleat 2010).
5 Such as, for example, Machiavelli. See (Viroli 2018). For some this marks Williams out as a ‘weak 
realist’ (Rossi and Sleat 2014, p. 690).
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resolve the disagreement about the right and the good. Political constitutionalists, 
moreover, argue that we also need a decision-making procedure which is worthy 
of the respect of those over whom decisions are made; that is a decision-making 
authority which is legitimate. For political constitutionalists, the most legitimate 
form of decision-making authority is one which makes decisions according to a pro-
cedure which is respectful of all citizens involved in disagreement by treating them 
equally, that is where they are ‘regarded as equals and their multifarious rights and 
interests accorded equal respect and concern’ (Bellamy 2007, p. 5). Whereas they 
draw on different political theories in order to give content to their understandings 
of the equality and liberty of individuals in the circumstances of politics,6 they con-
clude that in questions of institutional design, and particularly the choice between 
judicial or legislative supremacy with regard to decision-making in the circum-
stances of politics, the latter form best respects their premises of equality in the face 
of disagreement, and is therefore the most legitimate form of institutional design 
(Waldron 2006).
Bernard Williams and Political Constitutionalism
With their common focus on the empirical realities within which political values are 
negotiated and applied in practice, the affinities between PC and Williams’s account 
of political legitimacy are easy to see. In particular, the primary realist features of 
Williams’s account—that political authority is something that needs to be negotiated 
on an ongoing basis, and that liberalism is not, in practice, the only way of securing 
political legitimacy—have a strong affinity with PC’s emphasis on disagreement in 
fact about the meaning (and in particular the liberal meaning) of fundamental rights 
and their subsequent preference for legislative supremacy.
These affinities between Williamsian realism and PC have been teased out more 
explicitly recently by Richard Bellamy.7 In a recent reply to critics, he explicitly 
employs Williams’s political realism to support the case for PC. Bellamy clarifies 
that the realism of PC lies not in its (ultimate) preference for legislative supremacy, 
but rather in its ‘realist’ starting point. This ‘realist’ starting point is the disagree-
ment inherent the circumstances of politics; disagreement about ‘which moral ends 
and modes of moral reasoning are to be preferred’ (Bellamy 2016, p. 213). In this 
defence, Bellamy argues that Williams advances a conception of legitimacy  that, 
like PC, establishes criteria for legitimate decision-making which are distinct from 
purely moral considerations.
He explicitly draws out the analogies between the political constitutionalists’ 
emphasis on disagreement, and Williams’s argument that political legitimacy begins 
6 For example, Waldron departs from a position of liberal equality, Bellamy from a republican concep-
tion of freedom as non-domination (Waldron 1999; Bellamy 2007). For a recent defence of legal consti-
tutionalism on republican grounds, see (Hickey 2019).
7 In particular (Bellamy 2016). Williams also gets a mention, albeit en passant, in Waldron’s  recent 
work (Waldron 2013, p. 7). See also (Fabbrizi 2018).
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with the ongoing answering of the ‘first political question’, concluding that both 
positions argue that ‘politics goes “all the way down”’ (Bellamy 2016, p. 207).8 He 
argues that Williams’s recognition that the BLD may not be answered in a singu-
lar stable way, shows that Williams acknowledges ‘the disagreements and conflicts 
that stand behind the very need for politics’ (Bellamy 2016, p. 212) which accords 
with the political constitutionalists’ emphasis on the circumstances of politics and 
the resultant preference for legislative procedures to channel those disagreements.
Furthermore, for Bellamy, PC’s emphasis on the ‘priority of politics and the ines-
capability of procedures’ (Bellamy 2016, p. 208) (due to the fact that an objective 
‘truth’ about justice or legitimacy is elusive), overlaps with Williams’s view that the 
BLD cannot be about a morality which is ‘prior to politics’ but is ‘inherent to there 
being such a thing as politics’ (Williams 2005, p. 5). He argues that Williams’s posi-
tion supports the PC view that the acceptability of an authority’s response to the first 
political question stems from ‘how rather than to what moral purpose or on what 
moral basis’ (Bellamy 2016, p. 213) the power of the authority is exercised. Wil-
liams’s view supports, Bellamy contends, the PC idea that the legitimacy of author-
ity will depend on whether political power is exercised ‘in a way that acknowledges 
the “circumstances of politics” which constitutes a manner capable of being per-
ceived as “acceptable” by those subject to it’ (Bellamy 2016, p. 213). This, for Bel-
lamy, supports the idea that legitimacy is always necessarily about procedures and 
forums for articulating and justifying political positions, of which legislatures are 
the most conducive in questions of institutional design.
Friend or Foe?: Bernard Williams and PC
Whereas there are obvious affinities between PC and Williams’s approach to politi-
cal legitimacy, these are arguably more superficial than substantive. To see how Wil-
liamsian realism is potentially incompatible with PC we need to return to PC’s ‘real-
ist’ opening gambit; the circumstances of politics. In the circumstances of politics, 
we should not only expect disagreement about the good—what public policy should 
be pursued—or about rights—does freedom of expression protect hate speech?, 
does the right to privacy permit abortion?—but also whether legislative supremacy 
as endorsed by PC, is, in fact the fairest or most legitimate way to resolve these disa-
greements about rights. Whereas PC emphasises the first two forms of agreement, 
they neglect this third form of disagreement and it is this neglect which, it is argued, 
causes PC to pursue a path of political moralism in defending legislative supremacy 
making Williams a problematic ally to their cause.
More specifically, with regard to disagreement about whether legislative suprem-
acy is the fairest method of resolving disagreements about rights in the circum-
stances of politics, PC attempts to resolve this disagreement in a way which fails 
to take seriously the good faith disagreement about the very question of whether 
8 Williams does not explicitly make this link. He argues that the perpetual nature of the first political 
question lies in the fact that it is ‘affected by historical circumstance’ (Williams 2005, p. 3).
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legislative supremacy is the most fair or legitimate way to resolve disagreements 
about rights. Waldron, for example, argues that even if we disagree about second-
order procedures about whether judicial or legislative supremacy is the most legiti-
mate way of resolving disputes about rights, we have no choice but to consider 
them. He argues that there are important reasons relating to legitimacy such as ‘fair-
ness, voice [and] participation’ (Waldron 2006, p. 1372) which tip the balance in 
favour of majority rule in a legislative assembly to make decisions in the face of 
disagreement about whether legislative supremacy is, itself, the most legitimate way 
of resolving disagreement on this point. With regard to this second-order disagree-
ment Waldron claims that we are left in a ‘legitimacy free zone’ where it is best 
to hope that a legitimate democratic system emerges ‘somehow or other’ (Waldron 
1999, p. 300) For Bellamy, with respect to the second order disagreement about the 
most legitimate form of institutional design, he argues that we must simply grasp the 
‘procedural nettle’ and start somewhere, whether that is the ‘already existing politi-
cal system’ or in the case of new regimes, with whatever can be ‘cobbled together’ 
to get the regime-building ball rolling (Bellamy 2007, p. 174). Once something has 
got off the ground, however, Bellamy warns against constitutionalising these initial 
procedures as there will be disagreements about those selfsame procedures. The pro-
cedures must, therefore, be left open because we are constantly ‘building the ship at 
sea’ (Bellamy 2007, p. 174). He asserts that legislative decision-making is a ‘neu-
tral’ (Bellamy 2016, p. 211) way of resolving disagreements on this second order 
question and that an ability to contest decision-making on an equal footing carries 
normative weight of an ‘independent kind’. That weight consists in ‘the way those 
subject to political decisions feel they are regarded within the decision-making pro-
cess itself’ (Bellamy 2016, p. 213). As such, he concludes that ‘the only way to real-
ize justice in our relations with others is through public deliberation about justice in 
which each has an equal say’, and, that it becomes difficult for justice to be done in 
‘any other way’ than by showing that it has been done ‘through the equal involve-
ment of those concerned’ which is best achieved through legislative procedures.9
The problem with these responses to disagreement about the fairness of legisla-
tive supremacy is that they seem to constitute a form of non-Williamsian political 
moralism. As noted, for Williams, political moralism is a position which makes the 
‘moral prior to the political’ (Williams 2005, p. 5), from which political disagree-
ment can be approached and resolved. However, Waldron’s and Bellamy’s propos-
als to resolve the second order-disagreement about whether legislative supremacy 
or majority rule is, in fact, the most legitimate procedure for resolving first order 
disagreements about rights, involves an institutional arrangement which seems 
to be  underpinned by a morality which is ‘prior to’, or ‘outside of’ disagreement 
under the circumstances of politics. This is apparent in their claims that legislative 
9 Bellamy (2016, p. 214) (emphasis added). He supports this point by reference to Mill’s comments on 
the ‘morality of being listened to’: ‘… it is a personal injustice to withhold from any one … the ordinary 
privilege of having his voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs in which he has the same interest as other 
people’ and ‘everyone is degraded.. When other people … take upon themselves unlimited power to reg-
ulate his destiny.. Everyone has a right to feel insulted by being a nobody, and stamped as of no account’ 
(Mill 1998, p. 335).
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supremacy or majority rule as a way of resolving political disagreements about 
whether it is the most legitimate way of resolving disagreements is neutral, when it 
in fact represents a particular (contested) viewpoint from within the debate itself.10 
The claims that ‘fairness, voice [and] participation’ have a special weight in the 
legitimacy of decision-making; or that legislative supremacy is ‘the’ theory of legiti-
macy (Waldron 2006, p. 1387); or that democracy is ‘self-constituting’ (Bellamy 
2007, p. 141) or retains an authority and legitimacy that is ‘independent from the 
right or wrongness of the policies it is employed to decide’ (Bellamy 2007, p. 141); 
or that ‘the only way to realize justice in our relations with others is through public 
deliberation about justice in which each has an equal say’ (Bellamy, 2016 p. 214); 
or that it becomes difficult to do justice in ‘any other way’ than by showing that it 
has been done ‘through the equal involvement of those concerned’ (Bellamy 2016, 
p. 214) are all precisely the type of claims about which we should expect disagree-
ment in the circumstances of politics. To claim that they are ‘neutral’ or enjoy a 
superior legitimacy appears to claim a moral position for these views which is prior 
to, or transcends, political disagreement. In this sense, then, PC as defended by Bel-
lamy and Waldron looks very like a form of political moralism. As a form of politi-
cal moralism, it involves an ‘applied morality’ (Williams 2005, p. 2) presupposing 
moral clarity about the justice, or fairness or legitimacy of legislative supremacy 
which should shape our decisions about questions of institutional design; something 
which Williams was sceptical of.
In this sense, then, both Waldron’s and Bellamy’s defences of PC can be said to 
reflect the two types of political moralism identified by Williams. Waldron’s account 
looks like a form of the ‘structural model’ of political moralism. The claim that leg-
islative supremacy constitutes ‘the theory of legitimacy’ suggests that the only legit-
imate form of decision-making is one which conforms with the claims of PC as to 
the superior legitimacy of legislative supremacy and majority rule. On this view pol-
itics can only be legitimate when it takes place within the structures of a legislative 
supremacy model of institutional design which is a claim analogous to other liberal 
‘structural models’. Bellamy’s account, on the other hand, resembles more closely 
the ‘enactment model’ of political moralism, whereby the aim of politics is to enact 
certain (a priori or transcendental) moral principles. This is clear in his emphasis 
that we must take institutional arrangements as we find them, but then work towards 
‘enacting’ a model of legislative supremacy which becomes the ultimate moral telos 
of politics.11 However, it was precisely these ways of thinking about legitimacy from 
which Williams was attempting to distance himself in stipulating the first political 
question and the BLD as a more realist approach to the legitimacy of authority.
In associating PC with either the structural or enactment models of political 
moralism, we do not have to conclude that legislative supremacy is in some way 
11 That is, that the only telos of constitutionalism in Bellamy’s account, is to keep the avenues and chan-
nels of disagreement open in the form of legislative supremacy as we are constantly building the ship at 
sea (Bellamy 2007, p. 173).
10 Eisgruber (2002, p. 37). In a Razian sense, they fail as theories of authority in that the solution repli-
cates the very disagreement which the authority is called upon to resolve. See (Mac Amhlaigh 2016a, p. 
189).
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inherently immoral or illegitimate. Williams nowhere states that political moralism 
is, itself, incompatible with the BLD. Political moralism does not, as such, represent 
a failure to answer the first political question in an ‘acceptable’ way; it is just one 
historically contingent answer to it. Rather, PC, like liberalism, ‘raises the standards’ 
as to what legitimacy—or the BLD—requires (Williams 2005, p. 13). In endorsing 
PC, as ‘the’ theory of legitimacy or ‘the only way to realize justice in our relations 
with others’, it, like liberalism, overshoots in what is required to satisfy the BLD. 
Thus, the political moralist mistake is to assume that no authority can be legitimate 
until the prescriptions of their theory are met, whereas Williams, departing from 
the premise of the solution to the first political question, argues that there are many 
ways in which an authority can be legitimate without meeting the (more exacting) 
standards of whatever account of moral theory the political moralist endorses—in 
our case, the superior morality of legislative decision-making. The first political 
question and the BLD, therefore could be answered according to a range of moral 
alternatives, including, potentially, legal constitutionalism.
Whatever the rights and wrongs of political moralism and PC as a form of politi-
cal moralism as characterised here, what is clear is that in failing to the take the sec-
ond-order disagreement about the legitimacy of legislative supremacy seriously, PC 
does not seem to be a particularly realist political theory in a Williamsian sense.12
12 There is one way in which Bellamy’s defence of PC could, potentially, be rescued from the charge 
of political moralism which he needs to avoid for his claims regarding the political realism of PC to be 
plausible. He argues that the support of the ‘input’ features of political disagreement which are achieved 
through legislative supremacy aim at ‘avoiding any group being so radically disadvantaged in putting its 
view that it could be regarded as being dominated by some other group or groups within that political 
society’ (Bellamy 2016, p. 213). The use of Williams’s terminology ‘radical disadvantage’ is interesting 
here. Williams contends that the BLD is not satisfied—that the answer to the first political question is not 
‘acceptable’—where a group subject to an authority is ‘radically disadvantaged’ (Williams 2005, p. 5). 
Being radically disadvantaged is defined as being disadvantaged as to what one can fear. For these pur-
poses, ‘what one can fear’ is defined as ‘what someone would reasonably be afraid of if it were likely to 
happen to him/her in the basic Hobbesian terms of coercion, pain, torture, humiliation, suffering, death’. 
Imposing such conditions on the response to the first political question does not result in political moral-
ism as, as noted above, resolving such a situation through organised authority is part of what politics is 
about on Williams’s view. Any response to the first political question which results in such outcomes 
fails to answer the first political question in that it fails to distinguish between politics and coercion. 
Therefore, if Bellamy’s account is to avoid the charge of political moralism he needs to do more to show 
how judicial review of the democratic will of the legislature constitutes being radically disadvantaged in 
this sense. However, it seems a stretch to argue that having a piece of legislation produced by a demo-
cratically elected body overruled by an unelected, but procedurally constrained, reactive body which is 
generally appointed by elected representatives such as a constitutional court, could be classified as being 
‘radically disadvantaged’ in terms of experiencing a form of coercion or humiliation. Furthermore, and 
more significantly, this does not seem to be what Williams had in mind in his definition of ‘radical dis-
advantage’. As noted above, Williams nowhere states that political moralism is itself incompatible with 
the BLD such that practices of judicial review endorsed by liberals such as Dworkin is not a failure to 
answer the first political question in an ‘acceptable’ way; it is just one historically contingent answer to it 
(Williams 2005 p. 12). Liberalism (and potentially also judicial review) could simply be said to add more 
than what might be strictly necessary in order to answer the demand.
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A Partial Defence of PC
There is a position in PC debates which, it is submitted, can support PC, includ-
ing as a method of resolving second-order disagreements about whether legislative 
supremacy is the fairest or most legitimate way of resolving first-order disagree-
ments about the good and the right, in a way which is more conducive to a Wil-
liamsian realism than the  putatively politically moralist defences put forward by 
Waldron and Bellamy. This position does not fully defend either legal or judicial 
supremacy on abstract normative grounds, but argues that both political and legal 
constitutionalism can be defended as legitimate arrangements in contexts in what it 
calls the goals of a minimal theory of legitimacy are realised.13 However the defence 
introduces an important qualifier: it will only be capable of defending PC where it 
is occurrent in actual practice. It is, in this sense, therefore, only a partial defence 
of political constitutionalism; it will also serve to defend legal constitutionalism in 
contexts where it is already practised and the requirements of the minimal theory 
of legitimacy are fulfilled. However, it is argued that this partial defence of PC is 
a more convincing defence of political constitutionalism in the Williamsian realist 
sense than, the ‘full’ defence of PC endorsed by Bellamy and Waldron.
The normative thrust of the partial defence of political constitutionalism is based 
on two ideas. Firstly, if we think of legal or political constitutionalism as norma-
tive theories—modes of practical reasoning prescribing reasons for action—then 
they are subject to constraints set by the ‘moral costs of transition’ (Räikkä 1998). 
That is, that in making particular prescriptions for action—such as institutional 
change from legal to political constitutionalism for example—a normative theory 
should factor in the moral costs in such change.14 Secondly, any normative theory 
prescribing reasons for action must make ‘viable recommendations’ in the sense that 
they must make recommendations which are both achievable and desirable15 (Stem-
plowska 2008, p. 324). Where the desirability of the prescriptions of a particular 
normative theory are in doubt because, for example, they are subject to good faith 
disagreement, then the viable recommendation condition of a normative theory is 
not met. In summary, the partial defence argues that, whereas the first condition can, 
in principle, be fulfilled by political constitutionalism as argued for particularly by 
Bellamy (although this will depend on the particular context), the second condition 
cannot in the light of disagreement about the most legitimate institutional arrange-
ments in the circumstances of politics.
The partial defence of political constitutionalism invokes a minimal theory of 
legitimacy based on what Rawls called the ‘Hobbes’ thesis; that is the securing to 
an acceptable degree of the ‘goods of the political’ such as security and welfare by 
an authority (Michelman 2003). Where the Hobbes thesis applies to a given context, 
that is where an authority in practice reasonably successfully achieves the ‘goods of 
13 For a fuller account of the minimal theory of legitimacy and its role in supporting a partial defence of 
PC see (Mac Amhlaigh 2016a, b).
14 What are often called ‘feasibility constraints’.
15 On the requirements of normative theory more generally see (Mac Amhlaigh 2019).
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the political’, then it can be said to be ‘self-legitimating’ under the minimal theory, 
to the extent that it does not transgress baseline moral principles (Raz 2009, p. 349). 
These principles determine the limits of the authority and self-legitimacy of actual 
constitutions or governing structures. In assessing the extent to which an author-
ity secures the goods of the political, the minimal theory of legitimacy appraises 
an authority in the round as a ‘governing totality’, rather than looking at individual 
provisions, practices or laws applied by the authority. Thus, in assessing the legit-
imacy of an authority from the perspective of the minimal theory, we must look 
at the ‘entire aggregate of concrete political and legal institutions, practices, laws, 
and legal interpretations currently in force’ within the jurisdiction of the authority 
(Michelman 2003). Under the minimal theory, such an authority does not have to 
secure the goods of the political perfectly or, more importantly, perfectly justly (not 
least according to a liberal account of justice), provided that it does so reasonably 
well and in a reasonably fair and just way. As such the minimal theory takes juris-
dictions as it finds them and examines the ways in which they can enjoy a baseline 
or minimum level of legitimacy through securing the goods of the political. In this 
way, the minimal theory defines ‘a threshold above which legal regimes are suffi-
ciently just to deserve the support of those who are subject to them in the absence 
of better, realistically attainable alternatives’ (Fallon 2005, p. 1798). This thought is 
nicely captured by Copp through the metaphor of a ‘leaky boat’: it is better to be at 
sea in a leaky boat than have no boat at all (Copp 1999).
The legitimacy enjoyed by an authority which reasonably effectively secures the 
goods of the political creates a moral presumption in favour of the legitimacy of that 
authority under the minimal theory. As an authority only enjoys a presumption as to 
its legitimacy, the premises and arrangements upon which the goods of the political 
are secured by an authority in the minimal theory are merely ‘pro tanto’ reasons and 
are therefore defeasible. There is, the option in minimal theories to ‘mutiny’ should 
the ‘captain of the ship’ be incompetent or unjust16 (Copp 1999).
Thus, an important aspect of the minimal theory is the specification of the point 
at which an actual authority transgresses the threshold conditions such that it loses 
its legitimacy and individuals are no longer under a moral obligation to obey its 
commands. One easy, if abstract, case of when the reasons for submitting to author-
ity are defeated is that envisaged by Copp; that is where societal needs ‘are so poorly 
served by [an authority] that either the society would do better if people viewed 
themselves as under no moral duty at all to obey the law’ (Copp 1999, p. 43) How-
ever, beyond this it is difficult to specify the exact point at which minimal theories 
are dislodged by countervailing moral considerations. One area where it is unlikely 
that the presumption in favour of the status quo will be dislodged is with respect 
to debates surrounding political and legal constitutionalism. That is, that the ques-
tion of  the legitimacy of legislative or judicial supremacy  will by itself be insuf-
ficient to dislodge the presumption in favour of the legitimacy of a regime which 
secures the goods of the political in a reasonably fair and just way in the light of 
16 In this respect, the partial defence is not a form of what Estlund calls ‘complacent realism’; that is, 
that which we are doing is also what we should be doing normatively speaking (Estlund 2014, p. 115).
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the disagreement about the legitimacy of each arrangement in the abstract (Mac 
Amhlaigh 2016b).
The partial defence, therefore, serves to support political constitutionalism where 
it is practiced and the minimal theory of legitimacy can be said to apply. Moreover, 
it does so in a way which takes second-order disagreements about legitimate pro-
cedures for resolving first-order disagreements about values seriously. In address-
ing the question of the legitimacy of authority within the confines of the debate on 
political and legal constitutionalism, the partial defence takes its constitutional set-
tlements as it finds them and serves to support the legitimacy of whichever arrange-
ment in terms of legislative or judicial supremacy is in place, provided that the 
goods of the political are secured in a reasonably just and fair way in the ‘governing 
totality’. Significantly, this includes the use of extant procedures to resolve second-
order disagreement about the legitimacy of using those procedures.
Where such a totality involves PC, then the partial defence creates a moral pre-
sumption in favour of the legitimacy of PC, including its use to resolve these sec-
ond-order disagreements. Where citizens disagree with PC in such a settlement, 
including its use to determine whether PC is the fairest way to resolve this second-
order disagreement, they can contest the use of PC. However, in doing so, they must 
advance compelling countervailing arguments for a judicial resolution of disagree-
ments, including second-order disagreements about procedures. Given that such 
arguments will be competing with the ‘self-legitimating’ existing arrangements and 
the feasibility constraints of transition (based on the fact that they secure the goods 
of the political in reasonably just and fair way), they must show that their proposals 
will resolve disagreement about this second-order disagreement in a fairer way than 
the status quo, while simultaneously securing the goods of the political at an accept-
able moral cost. If we assume the level of disagreement under the ’circumstances of 
politics’, this will be a difficult, if not impossible task.17 In a context in which a gov-
erning arrangement involving legislative supremacy demonstrably secures the goods 
of the political in a reasonably just and reasonably fair way, arguments advanced 
by legal constitutionalism such as nemo iudex in causa sua, or that legal process is 
a more impartial way of determining such questions, or that judicial processes are 
better at emphasising potential injustices in governing arrangements (Waldron 2006, 
pp. 1395–1401) will suffer from two deficiencies. Firstly, they will not enjoy the 
‘self-legitimacy’ attached to the existing governing arrangement practising legisla-
tive supremacy due to the potential feasibility constraints affecting such change18; 
and secondly, they will, themselves, be the subject of good faith disagreement and 
will therefore not be able to claim an independent superior legitimacy to legislative 
supremacy. Rather, the securing of the goods of the political in a reasonably fair 
17 This is not to suggest that there may not be other reasons for constitutional change such as strategic 
political advantage or for reputational reasons. See (Ginsburg 2008). The point is that assuming disagree-
ment in the circumstances of politics, the superior legitimacy of legal constitutionalism over political 
constitutionalism in the abstract, cannot be one of them.
18 Of course the extent to which feasibility constraints will feature as reasons against change will depend 
on the particular extant institutional arrangement. There may be cases where they will be low and there-
fore not operate as strong reasons supporting the status quo.
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way will be determinative of the issue—a legitimacy which covers the use of leg-
islative supremacy to resolve such debates in this context. From the perspective of 
the partial defence, then, the normative weight of legislative supremacy where it is 
practised is contingent, yet, importantly, it supports the use of legislative supremacy 
to determine whether legislative supremacy is the most just or fair procedure for 
resolving first order disagreement where it exists and where the goods of the politi-
cal are secured.
The Partial Defence and Williams’s Realism
There are a number of features of this partial defence which make it more sympa-
thetic to a Williamsian realism than the accounts of PC outlined above. Firstly, the 
starting assumptions of both theories are strikingly similar. The presumptions of the 
partial defence involving the securing of the goods of the political have a strong 
affinity with Williams’s answering of the first political question and the relatively 
open-ended conditions of fulfilling the BLD. Secondly, and more importantly, the 
partial defence takes disagreement, including disagreement about the legitimacy of 
political constitutionalism, seriously, but in a way which does not assume a form 
of political moralism. The contingency in the support for PC in the partial defence 
based on the fact that it relies on facts external to the theory itself—that a version of 
PC is already part of a regime’s institutional arrangements—means that it explicitly 
acknowledges that other forms of institutional design are also legitimate. In this way 
it is analogous to Williams’s view that the conditions for fulfilling the BLD can be 
secured through a variety of different ways.19 In this way it eschews a moral posi-
tion prior to politics with respect to the most legitimate form of decision-making in 
the circumstances of politics in a similar way to Williams’s conception of the BLD. 
If the partial defence does stipulate a form of morality through the securing of the 
goods of the political, then it is a form of ‘moralised’ politics similar to the account 
put forward by Williams. Like the BLD, it does not assume a morality which is 
‘prior to politics’ but rather, like the BLD, its morality is ‘inherent in there being 
such a thing as politics’; hence the goods of the political upon which it is predicated 
(Michelman 2003). The partial defence is, like the BLD, incompatible with ‘one lot 
of people terrorizing another lot of people’, presupposing as it does, a minimal and 
acceptable level of safety and security which form part of the very goods of the 
political (Williams 2005).
In considering the legitimacy of particular governing arrangements, then, and 
particularly when considering the institutional arrangements of political or legal 
constitutionalism, both the partial defence and Williams’s realism encourage us—
all other things being equal—to acknowledge the legitimacy of the institutional 
arrangements of a particular authority ‘here and now’ (Williams 2005, p. 11), and 
19 Reducing the possibilities to the alternatives between judicial and legislative supremacy, the minimal 
theory accepts that such arrangements are the product of our historical ‘circumstances’ or ‘conditions’ 
and can enjoy a legitimacy notwithstanding the fact that they do not fulfil the prescriptions of a particular 
political moralist paradigm such as liberalism, or, indeed, PC (Williams 2005, p. 7).
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even to resolve disagreements about the legitimacy of those very arrangements. 
Moreover, in taking seriously disagreement about the legitimacy of legal or political 
constitutionalism in a context where legislative supremacy is used, and endorsing 
the use of legislative supremacy to resolve those disagreements, the partial defence, 
in Williamsian fashion, encourages us to view our convictions about PC (or legal 
constitutionalism), not as ‘simply autonomous products of moral reason’ but rather 
as ‘another product of historical conditions’.20 In this way, the legitimacy of PC will 
be based on the historical contingency of its existence in fact in a particular govern-
ing arrangement.
As such, then, given that the partial defence accepts its constitutional arrange-
ments as it finds them within a broader securing of the goods of the political, where 
legislative supremacy is practised in a particular context, it will be considered appro-
priate ‘now and around here’ Williams (2005, p. 8) as a way of resolving disagree-
ments, including disagreements about whether legislative supremacy is the fairest 
way to resolve such disagreements. Its central normative commitments will ‘“make 
sense” as authoritative to those subject to them’ (Rossi and Sleat 2014, p. 693). As 
Williams notes, this is a ‘sound application’ of a ‘general truth’, the truth discovered 
by Goethe’s Faust: Im Anfang war die Tat—in the beginning was the deed (Williams 
2005, p. 14).
Conclusion
Debates in constitutional theory such as those regarding the legitimacy of leg-
islative or judicial supremacy in the interpretation of fundamental rights, have 
not been immune to the broader ‘realist turn’ in normative political theory. How-
ever, in emphasising the idea of disagreement as a central realist feature of such 
theories, it is important that we are realist ‘all the way down’ as it were, and also 
embrace the disagreements which will affect the conclusions of PC; that legis-
lative supremacy is necessarily the fairest or most legitimate way of resolving 
disagreements about rights. This article endorsed a partial defence of PC in order 
to achieve these aims. It argued that it does a better job of taking seriously sec-
ond-order disagreement about the fairest way of resolving disagreement about the 
interpretation of fundamental rights than conventional accounts of PC. Moreo-
ver, it is also closer to a Williamsian realist position than those accounts, not-
withstanding their co-option of Williams to their particular defences. That the 
partial defence is just that-only partial-is, it is submitted, a necessary price to 
20 Williams (2005, 13). Indeed, there is evidence in Williams’s essay that this is precisely what he, him-
self, thought about the legitimacy of particular constitutional arrangements such as legislative or judicial 
supremacy. Towards the end of the essay, he notes that ‘[t]here are needs that people have which seem-
ingly can be met only by more directly participatory structures; but equally, there are objectives which 
are notoriously frustrated by these, and other aims which are at least in competition with them, and con-
siderations which raise doubts about the extent to which any procedures can be really participatory any-
way. No transcendental or partly transcendental argument—one might say more generally, theoretical 
argument—could serve to resolve these conflicts’ (Williams 2005, p. 16). Emphasis Added.
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pay to secure the realism of PC as an account of a legitimate theory of author-
ity which takes disagreement seriously and factors historical context into an 
account of legitimacy in Williamsian fashion. At least with respect to the bare 
choice between legislative or judicial supremacy, in the absence of an Archime-
dean point from which to resolve such disagreement, we fall back on the histori-
cal ‘deeds’ of past practice to secure the authority of constitutional arrangements. 
Thus, whereas Williams can be considered to be a ‘friend’ of PC, it is only with 
respect to partial defences of the theory.
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